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Abstract
This paper investigates the international spillovers of government debt and
the associated risk of inflation within a monetary union when countries have dif-
ferent pension systems. I use a stochastic two-country two-period overlapping-
generations model, where one country has PAYG pensions and the other country
has funded pensions. The paper shows that the PAYG country can shift part of its
long-term debt burden to the funded country. Moreover, the PAYG country gains
from unexpected inflation at the cost of the funded country. In response to these
conflicting interests about inflation, inflation risk may rise with the level of debt
in the PAYG country. Higher inflation risk harms both countries. Actually, in
contrast to the debt burden, the PAYG country cannot share the negative effects
of a rise in inflation risk with the funded country. The scenarios analysed might
be especially relevant for the years to come.
JEL codes: E31, F41, G11, G12, H55, H63
Keywords: spillovers, pensions, debt, inflation
∗Address: Department of Economics, Erasmus School of Economics, P.O. Box 1738, NL–3000
DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Email: adema@ese.eur.nl, Phone: +31 10-4081808. Internet:
http://people.few.eur.nl/adema/.
I am grateful to Lans Bovenberg, Manthos Delis, Giovanni Facchini, Bas van Groezen, Bas Jacobs, Frank
de Jong, Lex Meijdam, Lorenzo Pozzi, Ward Romp, Harrie Verbon, Casper de Vries, Ed Westerhout,
seminar participants in Rotterdam and Utrecht and conference audiences at the Netspar workshop 2008
in the Hague, the 2008 IIPF conference in Maastricht, the 2009 Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis
and International Finance in Rethymno, and the 2009 EEA congress in Barcelona, for useful comments
and discussions.
1
1 Introduction
On May 2, 2010, the countries of the euro zone and the IMF announced to support
Greece with a rescue package of loans worth 110 billion euro. In the weeks before,
financial markets had lost confidence in the possibilities of the Greek government
to finance its debt. Interest rates on Greek sovereign bonds rose to double digits.
However, the rescue package for Greece was not able to restore confidence in the sta-
bility of the euro zone as financial markets turned their attention to other vulnerable
euro-zone countries like Spain and Portugal and there was fear of even more serious
contagion effects in government bond markets. Therefore on May 9, 2010, only one
week after the rescue package for Greece was announced, the Ecofin Council of the
European Union announced an even more impressive rescue package to safeguard
the stability of the euro zone. In addition the European Central Bank (ECB) decided
to buy governments bonds to restore the functioning of markets. This intervention by
the ECB was perceived as highly controversial and led to a lot of discussion about its
independence and credibility in the popular press. The events in May 2010 show that
high levels of public debt in one country can cast doubt on the overall stability of the
euro zone.
The worries concerning government debt will stay prevalent in the future as popu-
lation ageing will put even more pressure on the public finances of European coun-
tries. The European Commission estimates that the average debt level in the euro
area will exceed 140 percent of GDP in 2030 if countries do not reduce their primary
deficits and do not reform their pension systems (European Commission, 2009). Even
when rescue facilities will remain unused, high debt levels will have their spillover
effects in a monetary union, especially when high debt is associated with higher in-
flation risk. Higher levels of nominal government debt may lead to a higher risk of
inflation through various channels. First of all there is the temptation to reduce the fis-
cal burden of debt service through higher inflation. Second, doubts about the stability
of the euro zone will cause a depreciation of the euro (this is exactly what happened
in Spring 2010), which can lead to imported inflation. Third, if investors think that the
ECBwill purchase government bonds again in case many euro countries have trouble
financing their debt, this will be accompanied with higher inflation expectations. The
actions of the ECB in response to the sovereign debt crisis and its lack of transparency
about its decision making process (see for example Geraats et al., 2008) might lead to
a situation in which markets perceive its monetary policy as less credible. The lack of
transparency and credibility of the ECB’s monetary policy creates uncertainty and im-
plies that high levels of public debt can be associated with a higher risk of inflation.
This paper analyses the international spillover effects of government debt within a
monetary union, where higher debt levels might be associated with higher inflation
risk. To the best of my knowledge this paper is one of the first attempts that provides
a formal analysis of this issue.
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These international spillover effects are analysed in a framework where countries
differ in the pension schemes they use. Within the European Economic and Mon-
etary Union (EMU) we can, broadly speaking, distinguish two groups of countries
that have different pension systems which might lead to different interests concern-
ing government debt and inflation. On the one hand there are countries like Greece,
France, Spain and Italy that have extensive PAYG schemes, but almost no funded pen-
sions. In these countries PAYG pensions finance more than 90 percent of the income
of retirees (Boeri et al., 2006). On the other hand, there are countries like the Nether-
lands and Finland that have sizeable funded pension systems. The investments of
pension funds in the latter group of countries are substantial (see Table 1), and part of
these funds are invested in government bonds of countries that have installed large
PAYG schemes. This paper shows that the fact that funded countries finance part of
the government debt in PAYG countries creates conflicting interests concerning the
creation of inflation between these two groups of countries. The main idea is then
that the conflicts about inflation policy will increase in the coming decades as espe-
cially countries that have large public PAYG schemes will have problems financing
their pensions when demographic pressures rise. In these schemes the working pop-
ulation pays taxes to finance the pension benefits of the elderly and the temptation
for governments to use debt instead of raising taxes or lowering pension benefits will
be large.
Table 1: Total investments pension funds (% GDP, 2009)
Greece* 0.01 Spain 8.1
France* 0.8 Portugal 13.4
Belgium* 3.3 Ireland 44.2
Italy 4.1 US 67.8
Austria 4.9 Finland 76.8
Germany 5.2 Netherlands 129.8
*Data for 2008, as data for 2009 were not available.
Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics.
To address both the issue of government debt and inflation risk I develop a stochas-
tic two-period overlapping generations (OLG) model with two countries that form
a monetary union. One country has fully funded pensions and the other country re-
lies on PAYG-financed defined benefit pensions. Consumers allocate their investment
portfolio to stocks and government bonds. Both assets are risky; there is productivity
risk on stocks and inflation risk on government bonds. The major advantage of the
stochastic general equilibrium model in this paper is that it is quite tractable, which
allows us to focus on the main mechanisms that drive the results. Most papers that
develop stochastic general equilibrium OLG models use computable models (e.g.,
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Storesletten et al. (1999), Sánchez-Marcos and Sánchez-Martin (2006), and Krueger
and Kubler (2006)). There are a few papers that develop an analytical stochastic
general equilibrium OLG model, like Bohn (2001, 2009) and Beetsma and Bovenberg
(2009). These papers do not, however, derive the optimal conditions for savings- and
portfolio decisions of consumers as I do in my model. Moreover, this literature analy-
ses the intergenerational risk-sharing properties of pension schemes, while the focus
of my paper is on the international spillover effects of government debt and infla-
tion risk. For that purpose I develop a two-country model instead of the one-country
closed economy models considered in the aforementioned papers.
To obtain an expression for the optimal portfolio share I use the approach of Camp-
bell and Viceira (2002). This approach is also taken by Matsen and Thøgersen (2004)
who develop a partial equilibrium model where the PAYG pension system is treated
as a ’quasi-asset’ and derive the optimal share invested in this PAYG asset. They as-
sume that people only consume in the second period of life, so that the complete net
labour income received in the first period of life is saved. In contrast to Matsen and
Thøgersen (2004) I model the savings decisions of individuals andmore importantly, I
develop a general equilibriummodel where the effects on the rates of return are taken
into account. This is one of the advantages of the model in this paper; because it is a
general equilibrium model both the optimal portfolio choice and the equity premium
can be derived at the same time. This contrasts with the ’finance’ literature where
typically only one of the two is derived. In case one would like to study asset pric-
ing, the stochastic discount rate (i.e, the marginal value of financial wealth in the next
period) is kept exogenous, see Campbell (2003) for an overview. For the explanation
of portfolio choice, on the other hand, asset returns are taken as exogenous, see for
example Campbell and Viceira (1999).
Persson (1985) also studies the effects of public debt in a two-country setting1. In
contrast to Persson (1985), I consider two countries that differ in the pension scheme
they use. Moreover, while Persson (1985) only distinguishes between the effects in the
short run and the long run, I derive the whole transition path for the two economies.
But most importantly, in contrast to Persson (1985), this paper considers the use of
government debt in a stochastic two-country model, which allows me to also examine
the case where rising debt levels lead to more inflation risk.
This paper is also related to the literature that studies the interaction betweenmone-
tary and fiscal policy, see for example Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) and Chari and Kehoe
(2007). They show that monetary unification leads to excessive debt accumulation
and an inflation rate that is too high and therefore these papers provide a rationale
for having fiscal restrictions in case countries form a monetary union. Although my
1Fried and Howitt (1988) also analyse public debt in an international setting. This paper uses a model
based on assumptions that essentially differ from the ones made in this paper; they abstract from capital
accumulation and examine the effect of government debt on capital gains and losses.
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analysis also reaches the policy conclusion that fiscal restrictions are necessary in a
monetary union because high debt levels can lead to higher inflation (risk), the set-up
of the model and the focus of my paper is completely different than in Beetsma and
Uhlig (1999) and Chari and Kehoe (2007). In these papers the countries in the mon-
etary union are symmetric and the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy
is modelled as a game. In my model countries are asymmetric and I show that this
asymmetry creates conflicting interests between countries concerning the creation of
inflation. Moreover, in contrast to Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) and Chari and Kehoe
(2007), I develop a complete general equilibrium model where consumer- and firm
behaviour are modelled as well, to study the international spillovers of debt and in-
flation risk.
The main results are as follows. First, for a country using a PAYG pension scheme
it is easier to temporarily finance its pensions with debt when it shares one capital
market with a country that uses a fully funded pension system, i.e., the PAYG coun-
try experiences positive spillover effects in the long run. The country with funded
pensions, on the other hand, is in the long run adversely affected by the use of gov-
ernment debt by the PAYG country. In the short run, however, the spillover effects
may be opposite: The initial generations in the funded country may gain from the
rise in public debt in the PAYG country. The reason for this is that these initial genera-
tions mainly receive the gains from the higher rates of return that result from the rise
in debt, they do not, or do not fully, have the negative effects from the lower wages
that later generations experience.
Second, in an asymmetric monetary union where one country relies on PAYG pen-
sions and the other country has a fully funded pension scheme, the former country
gains from unexpected inflation at the cost of the latter country. This means that
there is a conflict of interest on monetary policy when countries with different pen-
sion schemes form a monetary union. If market participants do not exactly know
how the central bank will react to these conflicting interests (for example because
the decision-making process on monetary policy is not completely transparent) they
might perceive that the risk of inflation rises when the PAYG country increases its
debt.
Higher inflation risk harms both countries. It makes government bonds more risky
and less attractive to hold. The rate of return on bonds will rise relative to the return
on equity to induce people to buy the existing stock of government debt. The increase
of the rate of return on government bonds implies that the costs of government debt
rise for both countries. Actually, the negative utility effects from a rise in inflation
risk are larger for the PAYG country if it forms a monetary union with a country that
uses a fully funded pension scheme instead of a PAYG system. This result arises
because the funded country holds a relatively large part of the government bonds
and individuals in the funded country do not receive a safe PAYG pension benefit.
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Therefore these agents need to be compensated more in order to hold the more risky
government bonds, that is, the rate of return on government bonds has to rise to a
larger extent when a funded pension scheme is in place. The analysis in this paper
thus shows that although the PAYG country can export part of the debt burden to the
funded country, it cannot share the negative effects of higher inflation risk.
This paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the stochastic OLG
model. In Section 3 I discuss the effects of government debt. Section 4 analyses the
effects of an unexpected inflation shock where both countries try to compensate the
people that lose from this shock; the elderly. Section 5 explores the spillover effects in
case high debt levels raises perceived inflation risk. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Following Buiter (1981) and Persson (1985), I will use a two-period overlapping-
generations model of an open economy. The world consists of two countries, country
P and country F, which differ in the way the pensions are financed. Country P re-
lies on a PAYG pension system and country F has a fully funded pension scheme.
I assume a constant population size2 and dynamic efficiency in both countries. The
countries may, however, differ in population size. In this way, I allow for scale dif-
ferences between the two countries. The active population is Li, where i = P, F.
Define L
F
LP
= ν and normalize LP to one, then ν tells us the relative size of LF. The
countries are identical in all other respects. All variables in the model are expressed
as the amount per young individual and lowercase letters refer to the logarithm of
the respective variable. Throughout the paper the notation ’log’ refers to the natural
logarithm.
2.1 Risk factors
There are two risk factors, there is productivity risk (σ2a ) on stocks and inflation risk
(σ2pi) on government bonds. Investing in stocks is more risky than the investment in
government bonds, i.e., σ2a > σ
2
pi .
2This assumption may come as a surprise as the main motivation of this paper, as sketched in the In-
troduction, is that population ageing will exert great pressure on public finances in the coming decades.
To keep the results tractable, however, population ageing is left out of the analysis. The interested reader
is referred to Adema (2008a) where the rise in government debt evolves endogenously after a rise in life
expectancy. The international spillover effects of pensions under population ageing without the use of
government debt are analysed in Adema et al. (2008).
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Production
Production per worker is described by the following production function:
F(At,K
i
t) = At(K
i
t)
α (1)
where At denotes productivity at time t, α ∈ [0, 1] the production elasticity, and Kit
refers to the amount of capital per young individual at time t in country i, i = P, F.
Profit maximization and perfect competition among producers results in the usual
equilibrium conditions:
W it = (1− α)At(K
i
t)
α (2)
Rik,t + δ = αAt(K
i
t)
α−1 (3)
where W it is the real wage, R
i
k,t the return to capital and δ the depreciation rate of
capital. There is perfect capital mobility between the two countries, but labor is im-
mobile. Since capital can freely move across countries, the rates of return will be
equalized, i.e., RPk,t = R
F
k,t = Rk,t, ∀t. And because both countries are endowed with
the same production technology, this implies that KPt = K
F
t = Kt, and consequently
WPt = W
F
t = Wt. Following Campbell and Viceira (2002) I assume that the gross
return on capital (1 + Rk,t) is lognormally distributed. To achieve this I assume that
At is lognormally distributed and that there is 100% depreciation, i.e., δ = 1. This
implies that bothWt and Rk,t are stochastic. People do not have to form expectations
aboutWt, however, as At is already known beforeWt is paid (see Figure 1 in Section
2.2). People base their saving- and portfolio decisions on the future return of capi-
tal, so they do have to form expectations about this variable. The variance of the log
of the gross return on capital is equal to the variance of the log of productivity (see
Appendix A.1 for details), i.e.,
Vart[log(1+ Rk,t+1)] = Vart[log At+1]
σ2k,t = σ
2
a,t (4)
Inflation
Government debt is denominated in nominal terms and therefore there is inflation
risk on the return on government bonds. The two countries form a monetary union.
In a monetary union, inflation is a common risk factor for all members and therefore
inflation (risk) is the same in the two countries. As the main focus of this paper is on
inflation risk I do not include country-specific risk, like default risk, on government
bonds. Perfect capital mobility equalizes the rates of return on government bonds.
The gross real return on government bonds is equal to:
1+ Rb,t =
1+ RNb,t
1+ pit
(5)
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where RNb,t is the nominal return on government bonds and pit the inflation rate be-
tween t− 1 and t. The nominal return RNb,t is a predetermined variable and I assume
that the inflation factor ( 11+pit ) is lognormally distributed. Appendix A.2 derives that:
Vart [log(1+ Rb,t+1)] = Vart
[
log
( 1
1+ pit+1
)]
σ2b,t = σ
2
pi,t (6)
There are no risk-free inflation indexed bonds, which implies that there is a missing
market. Safe income in the second period of life, like defined-benefit pensions, would
(partly) fill this gap.
2.2 Timing
The sequence of events is shown in Figure 1. At the beginning of period t, the capital
stockKt and the nominal interest rate on government bonds R
N
b,t are inherited from the
previous period, as they are determined by the savings and portfolio decisions made
in period t− 1. Then, productivity and inflation are revealed. With this knowledge
the return on capital, wages and the real return on government bonds are determined.
Subsequently, households make their portfolio choice γit and saving decisions S
i
t (and
thereby their consumption decisions), which are also based on the expected future
asset returns. Consumers only face uncertainty about the return on their savings.
Figure 1: Timing of events
-
Kt
RNb,t
t
At → Rk,t/Wt
pit → Rb,t
Sit
γit
t+1
EtRk,t+1 ← At+1
EtRb,t+1 ← pit+1
2.3 Pensions and government debt
Intially, the government in country P runs a balanced PAYG pension system, that
is, pension benefits of the elderly (ZPt ) are covered by lump-sum
3 taxes paid by the
young (TPt )
4:
ZP = TP (7)
3Assuming proportional taxes, instead of lump-sum taxes, would reinforce the negative long-run
welfare effects, as the fall in wages, after a rise in government debt, implies less tax revenues for the
government and lower pension benefits for the elderly. Qualitatively, the results will not change how-
ever.
4By omitting time subscripts, I denote the initial steady state value of the respective variable.
8
PAYG pension benefits are guaranteed in real terms, that is, PAYG pension benefits
are safe. The function of safe PAYG pensions in my stochastic model is twofold. First,
it provides retirees with a certain minimum amount of income. Second, the PAYG
pension scheme partly removes the market incompleteness that people cannot invest
in any risk-free asset, as the system makes sure that part of the retirement income is
non-stochastic. In this way I incorporate the fact that a PAYG pension scheme also
serves as a risk-sharing and diversification device. PAYG pensions therefore have a
comparable role as in the literature that focuses on the intergenerational risk-sharing
properties of PAYGpension schemes, see for example Storesletten et al. (1999), Matsen
and Thøgersen (2004), Krueger and Kubler (2006) and Miles and Cˇerný (2006)5.
Governments issue one-period debt, which yields the real interest rate Rb,t. The
government budget constraint in the PAYG country is given by:
BPt+1 = (1+ Rb,t)B
P
t + Z
P
t − T
P
t − T
B,P
t (8)
where public debt per young individual at time t is denoted by BPt . Instead of levying
taxes on the young, the government in the PAYG country can also use public debt
for a while to finance the pension benefits of the elderly. At a later stage, additional
contributions (TB,Pt ) have to be raised to finance the interest obligations on the debt,
so as to stabilize debt per worker. In case of a balanced PAYG system, i.e., ZPt = T
P
t ,
debt per worker is stabilized at BP if:
TB,Pt = Rb,tB
P (9)
Note that Rb,t is known at time t as both R
N
b,t and pit are already known at the begin-
ning of period t (see Figure 1).
In country F, pension funds invest the contributions of the young (TFt ) and return
them with interest in the next period in the form of transfers to the then old agents
(ZFt+1). The funded scheme is characterised by fixed contributions and the pension
fund has the same investment strategy as individuals. This implies that contributions
5The idea of this literature is that financial markets are incomplete because there cannot be trade
with unborn generations and human capital is not traded. As a result of these missing markets the
young are too much exposed to wage risk and the old bear too much financial market risk. In case
financial market returns are imperfectly correlated with wages, this results in suboptimal diversifica-
tion. By linking PAYG pension benefits to wages, retired households obtain a claim to human capital
which is not traded on financial markets. In this way PAYG pension schemes can contribute to better
intergenerational risk sharing and diversification. In mymodel, however, wages are perfectly correlated
with stock market returns and therefore wage-linked pension benefits will not improve diversification
opportunities. To allow for imperfect correlation between labour and capital income one has to add an
extra stochastic factor like depreciation risk. This would complicate the analysis to a large extent and
therefore PAYG pension benefits are modelled as safe lump-sum benefits. In this way I capture the fact
that PAYG pensions are imperfectly correlated with financial market returns and therefore contribute to
better diversification.
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to the pension scheme are exactly offset by an equal reduction in private savings. The
funded pension system is neutral in the sense that the economy behaves in exactly the
same way compared to the situation where there is no pension scheme. Therefore, I
do not distinguish between contributions to the funded pension scheme and private
savings, that is, pension contributions TFt are included in total savings S
F
t . Moreover,
in contrast to the PAYG country, the pension benefits in the funded country are just as
risky as savings.
As pensions in the funded country are organised by pension funds and not by the
government, they do not enter the government budget constraint:
BFt+1 = (1+ Rb,t)B
F
t − T
B,F
t (10)
where BFt denotes public debt per young individual. The government in the funded
country keeps its debt constant at BF by raising a debt tax TB,Ft that is equal to:
TB,Ft = Rb,tB
F (11)
It is assumed that the level of government debt is the same in both countries in the
initial steady state, i.e., BP = BF = B.
2.4 Households
Expected lifetime utility of a representative individual born at t is given by the fol-
lowing utility function6:
EtU(C
Y,i
t ,C
O,i
t+1) = log(C
Y,i
t ) +
1
1+ ρ
Et
[
log(CO,it+1)
]
(12)
where CY,it is consumption when young, C
O,i
t+1 is consumption in the second period of
life, and ρ is the rate of time preference. Old-age consumption is uncertain at time t
because the rates of return depend on the realizations of At+1 and pit+1.
People can either invest in firm stocks which yield the stochastic return Rk,t+1 or in
government bonds with the stochastic return Rb,t+1. The share of savings that is in-
vested in equities is denoted by γit, the return on the investment portfolio is therefore
defined as:
Rip,t+1 ≡ γ
i
tRk,t+1 + (1− γ
i
t)Rb,t+1 (13)
6In the analytical part I assume a logarithmic utility function to keep the analysis tractable. To quan-
tify the effects of the various shocks I also show some numerical simulation experiments. In these simu-
lations I use Epstein-Zin preferences: EtU(C
Y,i
t ,C
O,i
t+1) = {(C
Y,i
t )
1− 1σ + 11+ρ [Et{(C
O,i
t+1)
1−θ}]
1− 1σ
1−θ }
1
1− 1σ . The
main advantage of using Epstein-Zin preferences is that one can take separate values for the intertem-
poral substitution elasticity σ and the coefficient of relative risk aversion θ. In this way risk aversion can
be increased without changing the intertemporal substitution elasticity, and one can make sure that the
economy does not become dynamically inefficient.
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Young agents inelastically supply one unit of labour. The consolidated lifetime bud-
get constraint is:
CY,it +
CO,it+1
1+ Rip,t+1
= Wt − T
i
t − T
B,i
t +
Zit+1
1+ Rip,t+1
(14)
where I assumed that the additional tax to stabilize government debt (TB,it ) is levied on
the young. Maximizing lifetime utility with respect to the lifetime budget constraint
gives the Euler condition:
1 =
1
1+ ρ
CY,it Et
[(
CO,it+1
)−1
(1+ Rj,t+1)
]
(15)
where j = p, k, b. To derive a solution for the portfolio choice γit, I follow the approach
of Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Campbell and Viceira (2002) and assume that the
joint distribution of consumption and gross returns is lognormal. Optimal portfolio
choice in the PAYG- and the funded country, γPt and γ
F
t , are given by (see Appendix
B for the details):
γPt =
log Et(1+ Rk,t+1)− log Et(1+ Rb,t+1)
(1− zt)σ2k−b,t
−
σk−b,bt
σ2k−b,t
(16)
γFt =
log Et(1+ Rk,t+1)− log Et(1+ Rb,t+1)
σ2k−b,t
−
σk−b,bt
σ2k−b,t
(17)
where σ2k−b,t is the variance of the excess log return of stocks over bonds, σk−b,bt is the
covariance between the excess log return and the log return on bonds, and zt is equal
to:
zt =
ZPt+1
Et(1+ RPp,t+1) exp(−
1
2(σ
2
pt)
P)SPt + Z
P
t+1
(18)
The denominator can be interpreted as the expected consumption in the second pe-
riod of life. The exp(·) term results from the assumption that the gross returns are
lognormally distributed, see Appendix B for more details. The term zt therefore rep-
resents the part of expected old-age consumption financed by PAYG pensions.
Comparing equations (16) and (17), it is easy to see that people in the country with
the PAYG pension scheme invest relatively more in the risky asset, i.e., γPt > γ
F
t . The
reason is that the safe PAYGpension benefit reduces the variance of old-age consump-
tion.
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Optimal savings are given by (see Appendix C for details):
SPt =
exp
[
1
2 z
2
t (σ
2
pt)
P
]
1+ ρ + exp
[
1
2 z
2
t (σ
2
pt)
P
] (Wt − TPt − TB,Pt )
−
1+ ρ
1+ ρ + exp
[
1
2 z
2
t (σ
2
pt)
P
] ZPt+1
Et(1+ RPp,t+1) exp[−
1
2 (σ
2
pt)
P]
(19)
SFt =
1
2+ ρ
(
Wt − T
B,F
t
)
(20)
In general, a higher level of uncertainty affects savings in two ways (see for example
Sandmo (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971)). First, there is an income effect
(precautionary savings) which induces people to save more if uncertainty increases.
Secondly, there is a substitution effect: An increase in the degree of risk makes the
consumer less inclined to expose his or her resources to the possibility of loss, so that
savings fall. Without a PAYG pension scheme, the assumption of a logarithmic utility
function implies that the income effect and the substitution effect exactly offset each
other as the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals one. Savings in the funded
country therefore do not react to changes in uncertainty (see equation (20)). The fact
that people in country P receive a safe PAYGpension benefit during retirement makes
that they act like a consumer with a coefficient of relative risk aversion between 0 and
1. In that case the substitution effect dominates the income effect, so that savings in
the PAYG country fall when the risk on the portfolio rises7.
The logarithmic utility function also means that the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitutions is equal to one, implying that optimal savings in country F do not depend
on the rates of return. For the same reason, optimal savings in country P only react
to changes in the portfolio return because it changes the net present value of the pen-
sion benefit. A higher portfolio return decreases the net present value of ZPt+1 and
therefore affects savings in the PAYG country positively.
2.5 Equilibrium in the international capital market
Individuals invest their savings either in the home country or abroad. The interna-
tional capital market is in equilibrium when total savings at time t finance the capital
stock and the total amount of government debt in both countries in the next period:
SPt + νS
F
t = (1+ ν)Kt+1 + (B
P
t+1 + νB
F
t+1) (21)
7Actually, there is also a second-order effect via the safe PAYG benefit as this reduces the variance of
old-age consumption. See Appendix D for details.
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Moreover, the portfolio allocation has to be such that the right amount of savings goes
to the capital stock and government debt:
γPt S
P
t + νγ
F
t S
F
t = (1+ ν)Kt+1 (22)
(1− γPt )S
P
t + ν(1− γ
F
t )S
F
t = B
P
t+1 + νB
F
t+1 (23)
where one of the equations is redundant. This implies that there are two equilibrium
conditions and the predetermined variables Kt+1 and R
N
b,t+1 adjust to make sure that
these equilibrium conditions are satisfied8. As old-age consumption in country P is
partly financed by a transfer from the young, while in country F old-age consump-
tion has to be completely financed by savings, the latter country has higher savings,
implying that country F exports capital abroad. The higher savings in the funded
country combined with the fact that people in this country invest a larger part of their
savings in government bonds also implies that country F finances part of the govern-
ment debt of country P.
3 Government debt
As explained in the Introduction, the major threat to long-term fiscal solvency in Eu-
rope is the ageing of the population in the coming decades. This demographic pres-
sure on public finances will be especially large in countries that have large public
pension schemes financed on the basis of pay-as-you-go. Population ageing will in-
crease the relative number of elderly compared to the number of young people, im-
plying that PAYG contributions have to rise to a large extent if the government does
not want to reduce pension benefits. These PAYG countries might therefore decide
to finance their higher pension obligations by issuing more debt instead of raising
PAYG contributions or lowering pension benefits. The purpose of this section is to
analyse the (international) effects of the use of government debt by the PAYG country
to temporarily finance its pension obligations. To keep the results tractable, I leave
population ageing out of the analysis. The main results do not change if the rise in
government debt evolves endogenously after an increase in the relative number of
elderly people. The interested reader is referred to Adema (2008a) where this case is
considered.
Suppose the government in the PAYG country temporarily uses debt to (partly)
finance its pension obligations. This implies that contributions to the PAYG scheme
fall short of the pension benefits (TPt 6= Z
P
t ) for a while and this is modelled as follows:
TPt = µtZ
P
t
8I checked for stability by verifying whether the two eigenvalues of the dynamic system given in
equations (21) and (22) were within the unit circle. This was the case for realistic parameter values.
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where µt ≤ 1. To calculate the effect of public debt over time analytically, I employ
the method of comparative dynamics developed by Judd (1982). The process for µt is
given by:
µt = 1+ ζ ft
where ft ≤ 0 describes the time pattern of a perturbation of µt from its steady state
value (= 1) and ζ reflects the magnitude of this perturbation. The effects of the use of
government debt can be traced by linearizing the various equations with respect to ζ
around the initial steady state. The change in PAYG contributions TPt is equal to:
∂TPt
∂ζ
= ZP ft (24)
The government can only increase its debt for a certain number of periods, otherwise
the government debt dynamics becomes unstable. Assume that the government uses
debt until period t∗ and from period t∗ + 1 onwards PAYG contributions are back on
their old level and the PAYG scheme is balanced again:
ft =
{
∈ [−1, 0) for t = [0, t∗]
0 for t = [t∗ + 1,∞)
As soon as the PAYG scheme is back to balance, the debt tax TB,Pt is raised in such a
way that the debt per capita is constant again, but at a higher level than in the initial
steady state:
∂TB,Pt
∂ζ
=


BP
1+ pi
∂RNb,t
∂ζ
for t = [0, t∗]
BP
1+ pi
∂RNb,t
∂ζ
+ Rb
∂BPt
∂ζ
for t = [t∗ + 1,∞)
(25)
The debt tax in the funded country will also change due to the change of the nominal
interest rate on government debt:
∂TB,Ft
∂ζ
=
BF
1+ pi
∂RNb,t
∂ζ
(26)
The debt dynamics for the PAYG country are derived by linearizing the government
budget constraint (8):
∂BPt+1
∂ζ
= (1+ Rb)
∂BPt
∂ζ
+
BP
1+ pi
∂RNb,t
∂ζ
−
∂TPt
∂ζ
−
∂TB,Pt
∂ζ
(27)
We can now derive the dynamic equations for the two predetermined variables, the
capital-labour ratio and the nominal return on public debt.
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3.1 The change in the capital-labour ratio and the nominal return on debt
The first-order difference equations for the two predetermined variables Kt+1 and
RNb,t+1 are as follows (see Appendix D for details):
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
=
αW
ΨK
∂Kt
∂ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
5
−
Ων
ΨF
∂TB,Ft
∂ζ
−
1
ΨP
∂TB,Pt
∂ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
−
1
ΨP
∂TPt
∂ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
(28)
−
1
1+ ν− SP
σ2p
∆σ2p
− SPRp∆Rp︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
[
∂BPt+1
∂ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
− ΩBP
∂BPt+1
∂ζ
]
∂SFt
∂ζ
=
αW
(2+ ρ)K
∂Kt
∂ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
5
−
1
2+ ρ
∂TB,Ft
∂ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
(29)
∂RNb,t+1
∂ζ
= −Φ
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
−
ν(γP − γF)σ2k−b(1+ R
N
b )
νSF + S
P
1−z
∂SFt
∂ζ
+
γPσ2k−b(1+ R
N
b )
νSF + S
P
1−z
∂BPt+1
∂ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
(30)
where Ψ, ΨF, ΨP, Ω, SP
σ2p
, ∆σ2p , S
P
Rp
, ∆Rp , ΩBP , and Φ are defined in Appendix D.
Equations (28) and (30) show the change in the capital-labour ratio and the nominal
interest rate over time after an increase in goverment debt in the PAYG country when
the two economies have a joint capital market. To analyze the international spillover
effects, I derive the same kind of equations for the case where the two economies
are closed. Obviously, in country F nothing happens when it is a closed economy, as
pensions are arranged by private pension funds and no government debt is used to
temporarily finance the pensions. By comparing the results in the closed-economy
case with the effects when the two countries have integrated capital markets, I derive
the pure spillover effects of the use of government debt in a common capital market9.
I do not show the systemof dynamic equations for the closed-economy case, however,
as the system above can easily be used to explain the spillover effects.
Suppose the government in the PAYG country decides at t = 0 to use debt to (partly)
finance its pension obligations during one period (so t∗ = 0). This implies that the
level of government debt increases at t = 1 and stays at this higher level afterwards.
Public debt has a direct crowding-out effect on the capital stock (this effect is indicated
by term 1 in equation (28)). The lower PAYG contributions at t = 0, on the other hand,
induce higher savings and this positively affects the capital-labour ratio in period
9To exclude the effects of integration, it is assumed that the initial steady state is the same in all cases.
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t = 1 (term 2 in equation (28)). The negative effect of public debt on the capital-labour
ratio is larger than the positive effect that results from the rise in savings, however, so
that the capital-labour ratio decreases at t = 1 (this is shown formally in Appendix
E).10
To finance the higher level of government debt the nominal return on bonds will
rise (term 3 in equation (30)), to induce people to invest a larger part of their sav-
ings in government bonds. This effect is reinforced by the fall in the capital stock as
this implies that individuals have to reallocate their investment portfolio even more
towards government bonds to have a clearing capital market (see the first term in
equation (30); if the capital-labour ratio K1 falls, R
N
b,1 will rise).
In case of an integrated capital market, the higher interest rate on government debt
will increase the interest obligations on the debt at t = 1 in both countries, which
increases the debt tax TB,it . In the PAYG country the debt tax will rise to a larger
extent as it also has to stabilize a higher level of debt (see equation (25)). A higher
debt tax decreases the disposable income of people and reduces savings (term 4).
This negative effect on savings is reinforced by the fact that a lower capital-labour
ratio decreases wages (term 5). Both these effects imply that the capital-labour ratio
continues to decline and the nominal return on government bonds continues to rise.
Figures 2 and 3 show some numerical simulation experiments to illustrate the me-
chanics of the model.11 And we have the following result:
10From equation (28) we can see that besides the direct negative crowding-out effect, government
debt also has a positive effect on capital accumulation (the last term in equation (28)). This effect arises
because people in the PAYG country also adjust their savings in response to changes in the portfolio
return and the variance of the portfolio (see equation (19)). Simulations show, however, that ΩBP is
fairly small. This indirect positive savings effect is therefore negligible and is dominated by the direct
negative crowding-out effect of debt.
11The simulation graphs show the non-linear transition path where also the indirect effects of the
portfolio return, the portfolio variance and savings on zt are taken into account. Moreover, I use an
Epstein-Zin utility function: EtU(C
Y,i
t ;C
O,i
t+1) = {(C
Y,i
t )
1− 1σ + 11+ρ [Et{(C
O,i
t+1)
1−θ}]
1− 1σ
1−θ }
1
1− 1σ with values
for the intertemporal substitution elasticity σ = 1 and the coefficient of relative risk aversion θ = 3
to better account for the effects of risk. The countries are of equal size (ν = 1) and the initial value
of the PAYG contribution rate is 0.14: TP = 0.14W. PAYG contributions are lowered by 20% at t = 0
during one period, i.e., f0 = −0.2. I used the following production function F(At,Kt) = AtK
0.3
t , with
E(A) = 1. Capital fully depreciates after one period (δ = 1) and E(pi) = 0. Agents are relatively patient
with a time preference rate of 1% per year, which gives ρ = (1.01)30 − 1 = 0.3478 when one period is
assumed to equal 30 years. The initial level of government debt is chosen in such a way that there is
still an equilibrium after the debt increase. I take σ2a = 0.2 and σ
2
pi = 0.01, which roughly corresponds
to an annual standard deviation of 8.2% for stock returns and 1.8% for bond returns, assuming that the
returns are serially uncorrelated. Here I follow Campbell and Viceira (2005) who show that returns on
stocks are significantly less volatile when the investment horizon is long and inflation risk on nominal
bonds increases with the investment horizon. The qualitative results of these simulations are robust for
changes in the adopted parameter values.
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Figure 2: Change in Kt
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Figure 3: Change in RNb,t
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 1600
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
period
 
 
dRb
N/Rb
N
d(Rb
N)P/(Rb
N)P
Notes: These graphs show the relative changes in the capital-labour ratio and the nominal
interest rate on government debt over time after an increase in debt in the PAYG country. The
solid lines refer to the case where one country uses a funded pension scheme and the other
country relies on a PAYG pension system. The dotted lines show the changes of the variables
in case the PAYG country is closed.
Result 1 In case country P uses debt to temporarily finance (part of) its pension benefits, the
fall in the capital-labour ratio and the rise in the nominal interest rate on government debt are
smaller in country P if it has a common capital market with a funded country compared to the
case where it is closed.
The reason for this result is that in case of an integrated capital market part of the
public debt in country P is financed with savings of country F and the crowding-out
of the capital stock will be smaller.
3.2 The change in utility
As soon as we have determined the changes in the two predetermined variables, the
capital-labour ratio and the nominal return on bonds, we can derive the changes in
all other variables. Appendix F presents the analytical expressions and the full inter-
pretation for the change in consumption and utility in both countries. Here, I only
show simulation graphs and I will focus on the main mechanisms behind the results.
Figures 4 and 5 show the welfare effects over time if the PAYG country uses govern-
ment debt to temporarily finance its pensions. Figure 4 shows the welfare effects for
the PAYG country. The PAYG tax is lowered for one period at t = 0 and this creates
a windfall gain for the generation born in this period and their welfare rises. Over
time, the additional public debt crowds out part of the capital stock. Moreover, the
return on government bonds has to increase in response to the rise in the debt level.
As explained in Appendix F, a lower capital-labour ratio has unambiguously neg-
ative utility effects in the long run in a dynamically-efficient economy that is a net
borrower on the international capital market. The rise in the nominal return on bonds
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Figure 4: Welfare effects country P
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Figure 5: Welfare effects country F
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Notes: These graphs show the welfare effects of an increase in government debt in the PAYG
country, measured in terms of consumption equivalent variation. The y-axis shows the
change in first-period consumption as a percentage of the wage that is needed to make an
agent in the old equilibrium as well off as after the rise in debt. A distinction is made between
the case where the PAYG country is closed (dotted line) and where it shares the capital market
with the funded country (solid lines).
has adverse utility effects as well, because this increases the interest obligations on
the debt and thus the debt tax that is levied on the working people. The long-run
spillover effects for the PAYG country are given in the following result:
Result 2 In case country P uses debt to temporarily finance (part of) its pensions, the long-
run welfare losses in country P are smaller if it shares its capital market with country F, i.e.,
country P experiences positive spillovers in the long run.
In the simulations the long-run welfare loss in the PAYG country is about 6.5 per-
cent in the closed-economy case, while welfare declines by 4.7 percent in the case of
integrated capital markets. The reason for this result is that the funded country ab-
sorbs part of the extra government debt so that the crowding out of capital is less and
the interest rate on government debt rises to a lesser extent (see Figures 2 and 3 and
Result 1). This implies that it is easier for the government in the PAYG country to
temporarily finance its pensions with debt in case it forms a monetary union with a
country that uses a funded system instead of a PAYG scheme.
The increase in public debt in the PAYG country will affect people living in the
funded country through the change in factor prices and the interest rate on govern-
ment bonds. The welfare effects for the various generations in the funded country
are shown in Figure 5. The fact that people in the funded country partly finance
the higher government debt in the PAYG country implies that they also experience
a falling capital-labour ratio (see Figure 2). As explained in Appendix F, a lower
capital-labour ratio will have negative long-run utility effects in the funded country
for realistic parameter values. Moreover, the government in the funded country will
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also be confronted with a higher interest rate to be paid on its debt. The following
result describes the spillovers for the funded country:
Result 3 The rise in public debt in country P leads to: (i) Negative spillovers effects for
country F in the long run. (ii) The initial generations in country F, however, experience
positive spillovers.
In the simulations the long-run welfare loss for the funded country is about 2 percent.
The reason for the positive spillovers in the short run is that these initial generations
only enjoy the gains from a higher portfolio return, while they do not (fully) incur the
losses that result from the lower wages.
In the simulation graphs, the two economies have the same size (ν = 1). However,
as most EMU countries mainly use PAYG pension schemes, the group of countries
that has sizeable funded pensions can be considered as relatively small. This means
that ν < 1 and when a large group of countries with extensive PAYG schemes uses
public debt to temporarily finance their pensions, the spillover effects for the funded
countries will be larger. For the PAYG countries, however, it holds that the larger
they are relative to the funded countries, the more the effects resemble the effects of a
closed economy.
As explained in the Introduction, Persson (1985) also considers the effects of govern-
ment debt in a two-country model, but then in a deterministic setting. The following
result summarizes the difference in welfare effects of debt between a stochastic and a
deterministic set-up:
Result 4 For a given rise in debt in country P, the negative long-run welfare effects in both
countries are larger in the deterministic case compared to the stochastic case.
The intuition for this result is as follows. In my stochastic model an increase in gov-
ernment debt also implies that the overall riskiness on the portfolio σ2pt declines, as
people hold relatively more bonds in their investment portfolio (γ decreases). The
decline in the portfolio variance dampens the negative utility effects to some extent
because individuals are risk averse, see also equation (72) in Appendix F. This effect
is not present when there is no risk in the model and therefore the negative long-run
utility effects of a given rise in public debt are larger in the deterministic case.
4 Unexpected inflation
High levels of nominal government debt give governments an incentive to lobby for
surprise inflation at the central bank as this will reduce the fiscal burden of debt ser-
vice. This section analyses the effects of such an unexpected inflation shock. I distin-
guish between the situation of a closed economy and a two-country setting where the
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two economies differ in the degree of funding of their pension schemes. It is shown
that in the closed-economy set-up unexpected inflation is a zero-sum game, while in
the latter case there is a conflict of interest on the creation of inflation between the
two countries. To isolate the effects of unexpected inflation, the effects of government
debt are not explicitly modelled in the analytical analysis below.
4.1 Closed economy
This section considers the effects of surprise inflation in a closed-economy setting.
This case can be regarded as the situation in which both countries adopt the same type
of pension scheme because this implies that there will be no capital flows between the
two countries.
Define the inflation factor as:
βt =
1
1+ pit
(31)
The time pattern of βt is as follows:
βt = β + ζgt (32)
A rise in the inflation rate is reflected by a negative value of gt. The effects of inflation
can be analysed by taking the derivative with respect to ζ.
If inflation rises unexpectedly, the expected real return and the realised real return
on government bonds will differ12:
∂Rb,t+1
∂ζ
=
∂EtRb,t+1
∂ζ
+ (1+ RNb )
[
∂βt+1
∂ζ
−
∂Etβt+1
∂ζ
]
(33)
When people do not expect any inflation (
∂Etβt+1
∂ζ = 0) and inflation rises unexpectedly
(
∂βt+1
∂ζ < 0), the ex post real return on bondswill fall, while nothing has happenedwith
the ex ante expected return.
Consumers have static expectations; their inflation expectations are based on the
current inflation rate13:
∂Etβt+1
∂ζ
=
∂βt
∂ζ
(34)
This implies that inflation can only be raised unexpectedly during one period, after
that people adjust their inflation expectations.
12It is assumed that in the steady state β = E(β).
13The main point is that investors could have the wrong inflation forecast: inflation is higher than
what they expected when they bought their nominal government bonds. This assumption is not very
unrealistic as one period is about 30 years. Over longer time periods the risk of inflation is substantially
higher (see Campbell and Viceira, 2005).
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Unexpected inflation affects the financial position of the government positively as
it decreases the real value of government debt and the real interest rate to be paid
on the debt. People that invested in government bonds lose from the unexpected fall
in the real return on government bonds, however. There are various options for the
government concerning how to use the interest gain. It can give the benefit to the
young by lowering the debt tax in the same period or it can repay part of its debt
so that future generations gain. In both these scenarios however, the elderly who
own the government bonds will lose. The third possibility would therefore be to
compensate these elderly. This last policy option will be analysed below.
Suppose that inflation rises unexpectedly at time τ. The real interest payments on
the debt decrease by −B(1+ RNb )
∂βτ
∂ζ . In case the elderly receive this entire gain, the
compensation to the elderly ZBt is given by:
∂ZBτ
∂ζ
= −B(1+ RNb )
∂βτ
∂ζ
> 0 (35)
The change in old-age consumption is then equal to:
∂COτ
∂ζ
= S
∂Rp,τ
∂ζ
+
∂ZBτ
∂ζ
= S(1− γ)(1+ RNb )
∂βτ
∂ζ
− B(1+ RNb )
∂βτ
∂ζ
= (1+ RNb )
[
S(1− γ)− B
]∂βτ
∂ζ
(36)
In a closed economy it holds that S(1− γ) = B, which implies that ∂C
O
τ
∂ζ = 0 and the
elderly are exactly compensated for the loss resulting from surprise inflation. Young
people at time τ know that the inflation rate is higher and ask a higher nominal rate
of return on government bonds, and the real rate of return will be back at its old
value. An unexpected inflation shock where the government redistributes its gain to
the debt holders that lose from surprise inflation, will therefore have no real effects
in a closed-economy set-up. The government can set its policy in such a way that
no generation is hurt after an unexpected rise in inflation. This is summarized in the
following result:
Result 5 In a closed-economy setting unexpected inflation is a zero-sum game, i.e., the gain
for the government is exactly high enough to compensate the people who lose from the unex-
pected inflation shock.
4.2 Open economy
In this subsection I analyse the effects of unexpected inflation in the open-economy
case where one country uses a PAYG pension scheme, while the other country relies
on funded pensions.
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Equation (36) shows the change in old-age consumption in case the entire interest
gain is transferred to the old at time τ. In the open-economy case, equation (23) has
to hold. Residents of the funded country save more and invest a larger part of their
savings in government bonds than people living in the PAYG country, therefore we
know that SF(1 − γF) > SP(1 − γP). Defining SF(1 − γF) ≡ ϕSP(1 − γP) where
ϕ > 1, equation (23) can be used to derive14:
SP(1− γP) =
1+ ν
1+ νϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 1
B
so that SP(1− γP) < B. This means that part of the debt of country P is financed by
people in the funded country. For the PAYG country it therefore holds that the term
between squared brackets in equation (36) is negative and combined with
∂βτ
∂ζ < 0 we
know that:
Result 6 In the open-economy case where country F finances part of the debt of country P,
consumption of the elderly in country P at time τ will increase after an unexpected inflation
shock if the government in this country transfers the entire interest gain to these people.
In the closed-economy set-up this gain was just high enough to keep old-age con-
sumption at time τ constant. In the two-country setting, however, unexpected in-
flation constitutes a Pareto improvement in the PAYG country; there is at least one
generation that gains from the unexpected inflation shock, while no other generation
loses.
For the funded country it holds that:
SF(1− γF) =
1+ ν
1
ϕ + ν︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 1
B
which implies that SF(1− γF) > B. This shows that people in the funded country do
not only finance their own debt, but also part of the debt of the PAYG country. The
term between squared brackets in equation (36) is therefore positive for the funded
country. So, we have:
Result 7 In the two-country setting where country F finances part of the debt of country P,
old-age consumption in country F at time τ still falls after an unexpected inflation shock even
though the government in country F transfers the entire interest gain to the old at time τ.
So in the funded country there is always at least one generation that experiences wel-
fare losses from unexpected inflation.
14It is assumed that the two countries have the same level of government debt in the initial steady
state, i.e., BF = BP = B.
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The above analysis shows that in the open-economy set-up the PAYG country gains
from an unexpected inflation shock at the expense of the funded country. It takes
advantage of the fact that the funded country owns a relatively large part of the total
amount of government bonds. The PAYG country can therefore export part of the
inflationary tax on debt holders to the funded country, while it still receives the full
gain of a lower debt burden and a net gain results. This means that there is a conflict
of interest on monetary policy when countries with different pension schemes form a
monetary union.
In the coming decades, the ageing of the population will put the public finances
more under pressure. The analysis is this section shows that if PAYG countries finance
their increased pension obligations by issuing more debt, the incentive of govern-
ments in these countries to lobby for surprise inflation will rise. Unexpected inflation
will, on the other hand, harm funded countries more if PAYG countries issue large
amounts of nominal government debt. The conflict of interest on monetary policy be-
tween PAYG- and funded countries will therefore be reinforced if population ageing
raises government debt in PAYG countries. If it is not clear to market participants
how the central bank will react to these conflicting interests (for example because the
decision-making process of the central bank is not completely transparent), there will
be uncertainty about what the final outcome for inflation will be. In that case the mar-
ket might perceive that there is a higher risk of inflation when public debt levels are
high. This scenario will be analysed in the next section.
5 Inflation risk
This section analyses the effects of the use of government debt by the PAYG country
if a higher debt level in this country is associated with more inflation risk. To keep
the analysis tractable this relationship between changes in the debt level in the PAYG
country and inflation risk is modelled by the following specification:
∂σ2pit
∂ζ
= λ
∂BPt+1
∂ζ
(37)
where λ shows the responsiveness of inflation risk to changes in government debt.
Equation (37) reflects the fact that the incentive of PAYG countries to put political
pressure on the central bank rises with their debt level, which increases the risk of
inflation. Government debt in the funded country does not affect inflation risk, be-
cause the funded country does not have an incentive to lobby for surprise inflation
as it always experiences a net loss from unexpected inflation (see Section 4). Inflation
is a common risk factor for all members of a monetary union. This implies that if a
higher debt level in the PAYG country raises perceived inflation risk this will not only
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affect the PAYG country but also the funded country that did not increase its debt15.
If a rise in government debt is associated with more inflation risk, the first-order
difference equations for Kt+1 and R
N
b,t+1 change to:
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
=
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
∣∣∣∣∣
debt
+
Ωσ2b
(1+ ν)− SP
σ2p
∆σ2p
− SPRp∆Rp︸ ︷︷ ︸
7
∂σ2bt
∂ζ
(38)
∂RNb,t+1
∂ζ
=
∂RNb,t+1
∂ζ
∣∣∣∣∣
debt
+
[(1− γP)SP + νSF(1− γF)](1+ RNb )
νSF + S
P
1−z
∂σ2bt
∂ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
6
(39)
where:
Ωσ2b
≡
(1− γP)SP + νSF(1− γF)
(νSF(1− z) + SP)σ2k−b
{
SPRp(1− γ
P)E(1+ Rb)(1− z)σ
2
k−b
− SPRp [E(Rk)− E(Rb)]− S
P
σ2p
(2γPσ2k−b + 2σk−b,b)
}
+ SPRp
[E(Rk)− E(Rb)](1− γ
P)
σ2k−b
+ SPσ2p(1− γ
P)
(
1+ γP +
2σk−b,b
σ2k−b
) (40)
and:
∂σ2bt
∂ζ
=
∂σ2pit
∂ζ
(41)
The main effect of an increase in inflation risk works through the change in the nomi-
nal return on government bonds. Higher inflation risk increases the riskiness of gov-
ernment bonds, which makes them less attractive to hold. In response, the rate of
return on bonds will rise relative to the return on equity (i.e., the equity premium
falls) to induce people to buy the existing stock of government bonds. In equation
(39) this effect is indicated by term 6. This rise in RNb increases the interest obligations
on government debt in both countries and both countries have to increase their debt
tax to stabilize their debt levels. These higher debt taxes in turn imply lower savings,
which affects the capital-labour ratio negatively. This leads to the following result:
Result 8 If a rise in public debt in country P is associated with higher inflation risk both the
decline of the capital-labour ratio and the increase of the nominal return on government bonds
will be larger compared to the benchmark case analysed in Section 3.
A rise in inflation risk will also increase the overall riskiness of the total investment
portfolio. Savings in the PAYG country react to changes in σ2pt and therefore the extra
15This was actually one the central issues behind the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact
for the Netherlands.
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term 7 arises in the first-order difference equation for the capital-labour ratio. Simu-
lations show, however, that the term Ωσ2b
is relatively small. Inflation risk therefore
mainly affects the capital-labour ratio through the rise in RNb and the higher debt tax.
The fact that individuals are risk averse implies that a higher variance of the portfolio
has direct negative utility effects, however (see equation (72) in Appendix F).
Figures 6 and 7 compare the welfare effects in the different cases and we have the
following result:
Result 9 For both countries it holds that the negative long-run welfare effects of a rise in
public debt in country P are larger when this also increases the perceived risk of inflation by
investors.
There are three factors that contribute to this result. First, because individuals are risk
averse they are negatively affected by the increase of the overall risk on the portfolio.
Second, the fact that investors ask a higher return on government bonds implies that
debt taxes have to be higher which also has adverse welfare effects. Higher debt taxes
also lead to less savings and a lower capital-labour ratio, which is the third factor
that contributes to the lower welfare, as this leads to lower wages. In case the PAYG
country forms a monetary union with a funded country (solid lines) welfare declines
by about one percentage point more in the long run (from -4.7 to -5.7 percent). In the
funded country long-run welfare worsens by about 0.3 percentage points (from -2.1
to -2.4 percent). This implies that the negative long-run spillover effects from the use
of debt by the PAYG country are larger for the funded country.
If we compare the change in welfare effects for the PAYG country in case it forms a
monetary union with the funded country (solid lines) with the closed-economy case
(dotted lines), we can infer that the fall in welfare after a rise in inflation risk is larger
in the open-economy case. This means that:
Result 10 Residents in country P are affected more negatively by higher inflation risk when
they form a monetary union with country F.
This results from the fact that the nominal return on government bonds has to rise to
a larger extent if the funded country finances part of the debt in the PAYG country
compared to the case where the PAYG country completely finances its own debt. The
intuition for this result is as follows. People in the funded country do not receive
a safe PAYG benefit during retirement, which implies that these people need to be
compensated more in order to hold the more risky government bonds. Combined
with the fact that the funded country owns a relatively large part of the total amount
of government bonds, the rate of return on government bonds has to rise to a larger
extent to make sure that all government debt is financed. The rise in the debt tax and
its negative consequences will therefore be larger for the PAYG country when it forms
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Inflation risk
Figure 6: Welfare effects country P
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Figure 7: Welfare effects country F
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Notes: These graphs show the welfare effects of an increase in government debt in the PAYG
country which may raise inflation risk as well. The welfare effects are measured in terms of
consumption equivalent variation, that is, the change in first-period consumption as a per-
centage of the wage that is needed to make an agent in the old equilibrium as well off as
after the rise in debt (and inflation risk). A distinction is made between the case where the
PAYG country is closed (dotted lines) and where it forms a monetary union with the funded
country (solid lines). The lines with the diamonds indicate the welfare effects when not only
government debt is used but inflation risk rises as well. Inflation risk (σ2pi) rises from 0.01 to
0.04, which roughly corresponds to a rise of the annual standard deviation from 1.8% to 3.7%.
a monetary union with a country that uses a fully funded pension scheme instead of
a PAYG pension system. This shows that although the PAYG country can shift part of
the debt burden to the funded country, it cannot share the adverse effects of higher
inflation risk in response to a higher level of public debt with the funded country. The
positive long-run spillovers of forming a monetary union with a funded country are
therefore smaller for people in the PAYG country if a rise in government debt also
raises perceived inflation risk.
6 Conclusion
This paper has analysed the international spillover effects of government debt and
the associated risk of inflation within a monetary union where countries rely to a
different extent on PAYG pensions. It is shown that in a monetary union, the PAYG
country can shift part of its long-run debt burden to the funded country. The funded
country is therefore negatively affected in the long run by the use of government debt
by the PAYG country. The initial generations in the funded country may, however, be
positively affected by the rise in debt in the other country because these individuals
only enjoy the gains from the higher rates of return.
High levels of nominal public debt give governments an incentive to lobby for sur-
prise inflation at the central bank because this will reduce the fiscal burden of debt ser-
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vice. In a closed economy, unexpected inflation is only a matter of redistribution from
the old to the young- or future generations and can be implemented in such a way
that no generation gains or loses. In a monetary union where residents of the funded
country finance part of the government debt of the PAYG country, the PAYG country
experiences a net gain from unexpected inflation at the cost of the funded country.
This implies that there are conflicting interests about the direction of monetary policy
when countries with different pension schemes form a monetary union. In response
to these conflicting interests investors might perceive that there is a higher risk of in-
flation when the PAYG country increases its debt. In contrast to unexpected inflation,
a rise in inflation risk has adverse effects in both countries in the long run. Actually,
the PAYG country experiences negative spillover effects from the fact that they form
a monetary union with a funded country when inflation risk rises. The negative ef-
fects of a rise in inflation risk in response to a higher level of public debt can thus not
be shared with the funded country. The fact that the PAYG country cannot share the
negative effects of a rise in inflation risk with the funded country implies that it may
be in the interest of both countries that government debt levels stay at low levels. This
paper therefore shows that, in the light of the sovereign debt crisis in the EMU and
the future ageing of the population, it is important that governments clarify which
measures they will take to guarantee the sustainability of public finances and that the
rules of the Stability and Growth Pact are re-established. Moreover, it is important for
all countries that a central bank like the ECB is independent, credible and transparent
to prevent an increase in inflation risk when debt levels are high. Another implica-
tion of the results is that investors in funded countries might require governments in
countries that rely on extensive PAYG schemes to issue inflation-linked bonds to pro-
tect them against the negative effects of inflation. This is a development you already
see in Europe.
Obviously, the model in this paper has oversimplified the real world in many ways.
For example it was assumed that PAYG pension benefits are safe to account for the
fact that PAYG pensions also serve as a risk-sharing and diversification device. The
main results in the paper would still hold if one would change this assumption, how-
ever, as long as the funded country finances part of the government debt of the PAYG
country. The analysis can also be extended and modified in several interesting di-
rections. It would for example be interesting to study the role of country-specific or
default risk. This is left for future research as the goal of this paper was to study the
international spillover effects of government debt when this debt might be associated
with a rise of a common risk factor, inflation risk. Moreover, in this paper the in-
ternational capital flows arise endogenously because countries use different pension
schemes. This situation was studied because within the EMU differences in financing
methods of pension systems abound. There are of course other reasons why capital
flows between countries. For example, countries may differ in their rate of time pref-
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erence. If inhabitants of a certain country are relatively patient compared to the other
country, savings will be relatively high in the former country and part of these sav-
ingswill be invested in the latter country. The analysis in this paperwould not change
much if one would like to study this situation. The effects for the relatively patient
country would resemble the effects for the funded country, while the effects for the
more impatient country correspond to the effects for the PAYG country. The analysis
in this paper can thus be applied to various settings where saving levels differ be-
tween countries, which lead to capital flows. The central result, i.e., that government
debt and the associated risk of inflation will have adverse effects in the long run for
capital-exporting countries will remain to stand out in a model where the source of
capital flows differs from the one in this paper (differences in pension systems).
A Derivation variances
This appendix derives the variances of the log gross returns.
A.1 Return on capital/stocks
Take the logarithm of optimality condition (3) and recall the assumption that δ = 1:
log(1+ Rk,t) = log(α) + log(At) + (α− 1) log(Kt)
Now define log(1 + Rk,t) ≡ rk,t and logXt ≡ xt, where Xt can be any variable, with
the exception of the returns. We can then write:
rk,t+1 = log(α) + at+1 + (α− 1)kt+1 (42)
The expectation of rk,t+1 at time t is:
Etrk,t+1 = log(α) + Etat+1 + (α− 1)kt+1 (43)
Using equations (42) and (43) we can derive the variance of rk,t+1 given in equation
(4). Note that there is no expectations operator Et in front of kt+1 in equation (43).
The capital stock is determined by the savings and portfolio decisions made in the
previous period. This implies that the capital stock at time t + 1 is already known at
the end of period t.
A.2 Return on bonds
Taking logs of equation (5) gives:
log(1+ Rb,t) = log(1+ R
N
b,t) + log
(
1
1+ pit
)
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which can be used to write:
rb,t+1 = r
N
b,t+1 + log
(
1
1+ pit+1
)
(44)
Etrb,t+1 = r
N
b,t+1 + Et log
(
1
1+ pit+1
)
(45)
These two equations can be used to the derive the variance of rb,t+1 in equation (6).
B Portfolio choice
This appendix derives the solution for portfolio choice γit, i = P, F. Following the
approach of Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Campbell and Viceira (2002), I assume
that the joint distribution of consumption and gross returns is lognormal. For a log-
normal random variable X it holds that:
log EtXt+1 = Et logXt+1 +
1
2
Vart logXt+1 (46)
Using this condition, the log form of the portfolio-return Euler condition, i.e., j = p
in equation (15), can be written as:
log 1 = log
(
1
1+ ρ
)
+ log(CY,it ) + Et
[
− log(CO,it+1) + log(1+ R
i
p,t+1)
]
+
1
2
Vart
[
− log(CO,it+1) + log(1+ R
i
p,t+1)
]
which can be rewritten to:
Etc
o,i
t+1− c
y,i
t = log
(
1
1+ ρ
)
+ Etr
i
p,t+1 +
1
2
(σ2cot)
i +
1
2
(σ2pt)
i−Covt
(
co,it+1; r
i
p,t+1
)
(47)
where (σ2co t)
i ≡ Vart
[
log(CO,it+1)
]
and (σ2pt)
i ≡ Vart
[
log(1+ Rip,t+1)
]
.
In the same way we can derive the log form of the Euler equation of the return on
bonds, the so-called benchmark-return Euler condition:
Etc
o,i
t+1 − c
y,i
t = log
(
1
1+ ρ
)
+ Etrb,t+1 +
1
2
(σ2co t)
i +
1
2
σ2bt −Covt
(
co,it+1; rb,t+1
)
(48)
Subtracting the benchmark-return equation (48) from the portfolio-return equation
(47) gives:
Etr
i
p,t+1− Etrb,t+1 +
1
2
((σ2pt)
i − σ2bt) = Covt(c
o,i
t+1; r
i
p,t+1)−Covt(c
o,i
t+1; rb,t+1) (49)
First I derive the terms on the left-hand side of equation (49). To derive Etr
i
p,t+1 we
need to relate the log portfolio return to the log returns on stocks and bonds. As the
simple return on the portfolio is a linear combination of the simple returns on stocks
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and bonds (see equation (13)) and the log of a linear combination is not the same as
a linear combination of logs, I follow Campbell and Viceira (2002) and use a second-
order Taylor approximation of the nonlinear function relating the log individual-asset
returns to the log portfolio return16. First rewrite equation (13) to:
1+ Rip,t+1
1+ Rb,t+1
= 1+ γit
[
1+ Rk,t+1
1+ Rb,t+1
− 1
]
Taking logs gives:
rip,t+1− rb,t+1 = log
[
1+ γit(exp(rk,t+1 − rb,t+1)− 1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= f (rk,t+1−rb,t+1)
(50)
The function f (·) is approximated using a second-order Taylor expansion around the
point rk,t+1 − rb,t+1 = 0, so that equation (50) can be written as:
rip,t+1 ≈ rb,t+1 + γ
i
t(rk,t+1 − rb,t+1) +
1
2
γit(1− γ
i
t)σ
2
k−b,t (51)
where σ2k−b,t ≡ Vart[log(1+ Rk,t+1)− log(1+ Rb,t+1)] = σ
2
kt + σ
2
bt − 2σkb,t. From equa-
tion (51) we know that:
Etr
i
p,t+1 ≈ Etrb,t+1 + γ
i
t(Etrk,t+1 − Etrb,t+1) +
1
2
γit(1− γ
i
t)σ
2
k−b,t (52)
Equations (51) and (52) can be used to derive the variance of the log gross portfolio
return:
(σ2pt)
i = σ2bt + (γ
i
t)
2σ2k−b,t + 2γ
i
tσk−b,bt (53)
where σk−b,bt ≡ Covt[log(1 + Rk,t+1)− log(1 + Rb,t+1); log(1 + Rb,t+1)] = σkb,t − σ
2
bt.
The expressions for Etr
i
p,t+1 and (σ
2
pt)
i in equations (52) and (53) will be substituted
into the left-hand side of equation (49).
The lifetime budget constraint of an individual is used to derive the covariances
between old-age consumption and the returns on the right-hand side of equation (49).
Rewriting equation (14) and taking logs gives:
co,it+1 = r
i
p,t+1 + log
[
expwt − exp τ
i
t − exp τ
B,i
t + exp(z
i
t+1 − r
i
p,t+1)− exp c
y,i
t
]
For the funded country it holds that ZFt+1 = (1+ R
F
p,t+1)T
F
t , implying that the pension
terms in the above equations can be substituted out. Combined with the fact that a
16This approximation holds exactly in continuous time and is an accurate approximation over short
discrete time periods. The question is, however, whether this approximation can still be used in a two-
period OLG model, where one period is around 30 years. Viceira (2001), Campbell and Viceira (2002)
and Barberis (2000) show that the magnitude of the horizon effects are negligible, which implies that
the approximation is still satisfactory for longer holding periods. Own simulations also indicate that the
error is 0.7% at most.
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logarithmic utility function implies that agents consume a fixed proportion of their
wealth, it is not necessary to take a first-order approximation of the consumer’s bud-
get constraint to obtain the covariance between the returns and old-age consumption.
See Appendix 5.A in Adema (2008a) for more details. For the PAYG country I ap-
proximate the term between the brackets with a first-order Taylor expansion around
rPp,t+1 = Etr
P
p,t+1
17:
co,Pt+1 ≈ r
P
p,t+1 + log
[
expwt − exp τ
P
t − exp τ
B,P
t + exp(z
P
t+1 − Etr
P
p,t+1)− exp c
y,P
t
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ lt
−
exp(zPt+1 − Etr
P
p,t+1)
lt︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ zt
(rPp,t+1 − Etr
P
p,t+1)
(54)
The term zt can be rewritten to:
zt =
ZPt+1
Et(1+ RPp,t+1) exp(−
1
2(σ
2
pt)
P) SPt + Z
P
t+1
≈
PAYG pension benefit
expected old-age consumption
(55)
where I used the fact that Etr
P
p,t+1 = Et log(1+ R
P
p,t+1) = log Et(1+ R
P
p,t+1)−
1
2(σ
2
pt)
P
and SPt = Wt− T
P
t − T
B,P
t −C
y,P
t . The term zt is the part of expected old-age consump-
tion financed by PAYG pensions.
Equation (54) can be used to derive the variance of the log of old-age consumption
and the covariance between the log of old-age consumption and the log gross returns:
(σ2cot)
P = (1− zt)
2(σ2pt)
P (56)
Covt(c
o,P
t+1; r
P
p,t+1) = (1− zt)(σ
2
pt)
P (57)
Covt(c
o,P
t+1; rb,t+1) = (1− zt)σ
2
bt + (1− zt)γ
P
t σk−b,bt (58)
The expressions for the funded country are the same, except that zt = 0. Equation
(56) shows very clearly that safe PAYG pension benefits lower the variance of old-age
consumption.
Substituting equations (52), (53), (57) and (58) into equation (49) gives:
γit(Etrk,t+1 − Etrb,t+1) +
1
2
γitσ
2
k−b,t + γ
i
tσk−b,bt = (1− zt)(γ
i
t)
2σ2k−b,t + (1− zt)γ
i
tσk−b,bt
Dividing by γit and rearranging gives a solution for portfolio choice:
γit =
Etrk,t+1 − Etrb,t+1 +
1
2 σ
2
k−b,t
(1− zt)σ2k−b,t
+
zt
1− zt
σk−b,bt
σ2k−b,t
17This is comparable to the approximation of a linear intertemporal budget constraint in Campbell
(1993).
31
Using the fact that the gross returns on stocks and bonds are lognormally distributed
gives the expressions for γPt and γ
F
t (zt = 0) in terms of simple returns (equations (16)
and (17)).
C Savings
This appendix derives the solutions for savings given in equations (19) and (20). As
the optimal condition for the funded country can be directly deduced from the opti-
mal savings condition for the PAYG country, setting zt = TPt = Z
P
t+1 = 0, I only derive
the optimal condition for individuals living in the PAYG country.
Using equation (54) I can write:
Etc
o,P
t+1 = Etr
P
p,t+1 + log lt
Substitute this equation into the log portfolio-return Euler condition (47):
log lt − c
y,P
t = log
(
1
1+ ρ
)
+
1
2
(
σ2cot
)P
+
1
2
(
σ2pt
)P
−Covt
(
co,Pt+1; r
P
p,t+1
)
Using equations (56) and (57) this equation can be rewritten to:[
Wt − T
P
t − T
B,P
t +
ZPt+1
Et(1+ RPp,t+1) exp(−
1
2(σ
2
pt)
P)
− CY,Pt
]
1
CY,Pt
(
1
1+ ρ
)−1
= exp
[
1
2
z2t
(
σ2pt
)P]
Rearranging this equation gives the optimal condition for consumption when young:
CY,Pt =
1+ ρ
1+ ρ + exp
[
1
2 z
2
t (σ
2
pt)
P
] [Wt − TPt − TB,Pt + ZPt+1
Et(1+ RPp,t+1) exp(−
1
2 (σ
2
pt)
P)
]
This equation can be used to derive the optimal condition for savings in the PAYG
country, equation (19).
D Government debt
This appendix shows the derivation of the first-order difference equations for the
capital-labour ratio and the nominal return on government debt in case the govern-
ment in country P uses debt instead of taxes to (partly) finance the pension benefits
of the elderly.
Linearize equation (21) with respect to ζ around the initial steady state and rear-
ranging gives:
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
=
1
1+ ν
[
∂SPt
∂ζ
+ ν
∂SFt
∂ζ
−
∂BPt+1
∂ζ
]
(59)
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From equation (20) we can derive the change of savings in the funded country:
∂SFt
∂ζ
=
1
2+ ρ
(
∂Wt
∂ζ
−
∂TB,Ft
∂ζ
)
(60)
The total derivative of savings in the PAYG country is18:
∂SPt
∂ζ
=
∂SPt
∂Wt
∂Wt
∂ζ
+
∂SPt
∂TPt
∂TPt
∂ζ
+
∂SPt
∂TB,Pt
∂TB,Pt
∂ζ
+
∂SPt
∂EtRPp,t+1
∂EtR
P
p,t+1
∂ζ
+
∂SPt
∂(σ2pt)
P
∂(σ2pt)
P
∂ζ
(61)
Using equation (19) we can derive the partial derivatives of SPt . The derivatives with
respect toWt, T
P
t and T
B,P
t are very straightforward and will not be shown here. The
partial derivatives with respect to EtR
P
p,t+1 and (σ
2
pt)
P are:
∂SPt
∂EtR
P
p,t+1
=
(1+ ρ)ZP{
1+ ρ + exp[ 12 z
2(σ2p)
P]
}
exp[− 12 (σ
2
p)
P]
[
E(1+ RPp)
]2 > 0 (62)
∂SPt
∂(σ2pt)
P
=
1
2 z
2(1+ ρ) exp[ 12 z
2(σ2p)
P]{
1+ ρ + exp[ 12 z
2(σ2p)
P]
}2
{
W − TP − TB,P +
ZP
E(1+ RPp) exp[−
1
2 (σ
2
p)
P]
}
−
1
2(1+ ρ)Z
P{
1+ ρ + exp[ 12 z
2(σ2p)
P]
}
E(1+ RPp) exp[−
1
2 (σ
2
p)
P]
/ 0 (63)
A higher expected portfolio return increases savings in the PAYG country as this de-
creases the net present value of the PAYG pension benefit. As explained in Section
2.4, in principle individuals in country P act like a consumer with a coefficient of rel-
ative risk aversion between 0 and 1, because of the safe PAYG pension benefit. In that
case the substitution effect of more uncertainty dominates the income effect, so that
savings fall when the risk on the portfolio rises. The last term in equation (63) shows
this direct negative effect of uncertainty on savings in the PAYG country. There is,
however, an extra indirect effect of safe PAYG pensions that induces people to save
more when the level of uncertainty rises, which is shown by the first term in equation
(63). The intuition for this term is as follows. The non-stochastic PAYG pension ben-
efit reduces the variance of old-age consumption and this affects savings positively
as the substitution effect of uncertainty dominates. This positive effect on savings
becomes more important when the level of uncertainty rises. The ultimate effect of
an increase in the riskiness of the portfolio on individual savings is therefore ambigu-
ous. Simulations show that for a wide range of parameter values the indirect positive
effect shown in the first term in equation (63) is of a second-order nature. Actually I
could not find cases where
∂SPt
∂(σ2pt)
P > 0. Therefore I conclude that savings in the PAYG
country fall when the risk on the portfolio rises.
18The second-order effects via EtR
P
p,t+1, (σ
2
pt)
P and SPt on zt are not taken into account, as this com-
plicates the analytical expressions to a large extent. These indirect effects are taken into account in the
simulation graphs presented in the main text, however.
33
Using equation (2), the change ofWt is given by:
∂Wt
∂ζ
=
αW
K
∂Kt
∂ζ
(64)
In order to derive the change in EtR
P
p,t+1 and (σ
2
pt)
P we first need to know how γPt
changes. From equation (16), using equations (3) and (5), we obtain:
∂γPt
∂ζ
=
1
(1− z)σ2k−b
(
α− 1
K
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
−
1
1+ RNb
∂RNb,t+1
∂ζ
)
Using equations (13) and (53), the changes of EtR
P
p,t+1 and (σ
2
pt)
P are given by:
∂EtR
P
p,t+1
∂ζ
=
E(Rk)− E(Rb)
(1− z)σ2k−b
(
α− 1
K
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
−
1
1+ RNb
∂RNb,t+1
∂ζ
)
(65)
+
γP(α− 1)E(1+ Rk)
K
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
+
(1− γP)E(1+ Rb)
1+ RNb
∂RNb,t+1
∂ζ
∂(σ2pt)
P
∂ζ
=
2γPσ2k−b + 2σk−b,b
(1− z)σ2k−b
(
α− 1
K
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
−
1
1+ RNb
∂RNb,t+1
∂ζ
)
(66)
Substituting the partial derivatives of SPt with respect toWt, T
P
t and T
B,P
t , and equa-
tions (62)-(66) in equations (60) and (61) gives:
∂SFt
∂ζ
=
αW
(2+ ρ)K
∂Kt
∂ζ
−
1
2+ ρ
∂TB,Ft
∂ζ
(67)
∂SPt
∂ζ
=
exp[ 12 z
2(σ2p)
P]αW
{1+ ρ + exp[ 12 z
2(σ2p)
P]}K
∂Kt
∂ζ
−
exp[ 12 z
2(σ2p)
P]
1+ ρ + exp[ 12 z
2(σ2p)
P]
(
∂TPt
∂ζ
+
∂TB,Pt
∂ζ
)
+ SPRp
[
E(Rk)− E(Rb)
(1− z)σ2k−b
(
α− 1
K
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
−
1
1+ RNb
∂RNb,t+1
∂ζ
)
+
γP(α− 1)E(1+ Rk)
K
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
+
(1− γP)E(1+ Rb)
1+ RNb
∂RNb,t+1
∂ζ
]
(68)
+ SPσ2p
2γPσ2k−b + 2σk−b,b
(1− z)σ2k−b
(
α− 1
K
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
−
1
1+ RNb
∂RNb,t+1
∂ζ
)
where SPRp ≡
∂SPt
∂EtRPp,t+1
and SP
σ2p
≡ ∂S
P
t
∂(σ2pt)
P , see equations (62) and (63).
Now use the other dynamic equation (22) to derive:
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
=
1
1+ ν
(
γP
∂SPt
∂ζ
+ SP
∂γPt
∂ζ
+ νγF
∂SFt
∂ζ
+ νSF
γFt
∂ζ
)
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Combining this equation with equation (59) gives:
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
=
1
(1− γP)(1+ ν)
[
ν(γF − γP)
∂SFt
∂ζ
+ γP
∂BPt+1
∂ζ
+ SP
∂γPt
∂ζ
+ νSF
∂γFt
∂ζ
]
(69)
Substituting the changes of γPt and γ
F
t into equation (69), simplifying and rearranging
gives:
∂RNb,t+1
∂ζ
= −Φ
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
−
ν(γP − γF)σ2k−b(1+ R
N
b )
νSF + S
P
1−z
∂SFt
∂ζ
+
γPσ2k−b(1+ R
N
b )
νSF + S
P
1−z
∂BPt+1
∂ζ
(70)
where Φ ≡
[(1+ν)K(1−γP)σ2k−b+(1−α)(νS
F+ S
P
1−z )](1+R
N
b )
(νSF+ S
P
1−z )K
> 0. Use this equation to substitute
for
∂RNb,t+1
∂ζ in equation (68). Then substitute this expression and equation (67) into
equation (59) and simplifying gives:
∂Kt+1
∂ζ
=
αW
ΨK
∂Kt
∂ζ
−
Ων
ΨF
∂TB,Ft
∂ζ
−
1
ΨP
∂TB,Pt
∂ζ
−
1
ΨP
∂TPt
∂ζ
−
1
1+ ν− SP
σ2p
∆σ2p
− SPRp∆Rp
[
∂BPt+1
∂ζ
−ΩBP
∂BPt+1
∂ζ
] (71)
where:
∆Rp ≡
[E(Rk)− E(Rb)](1+ ν)(1− γ
P)
νSF(1− z) + SP
−
γP(1− α)E(1+ Rk)
K
−
(1− γP)E(1+ Rb)Φ
1+ RNb
/ 0
∆σ2p
≡
(2γPσ2k−b + 2σk−b,b)(1+ ν)(1− γ
P)
νSF(1− z) + SP
> 0
Ψ ≡
{
1+ ρ + exp[ 12 z
2(σ2p)
P]
}
(2+ ρ)
(
1+ ν− SP
σ2p
∆σ2p
− SPRp∆Rp
)
exp[ 12 z
2(σ2p)
P] (2+ ρ) + Ων
{
1+ ρ + exp[ 12 z
2(σ2p)
P]
} > 0
Ψ
P ≡
{
1+ ρ + exp[ 12 z
2(σ2p)
P]
} (
1+ ν− SP
σ2p
∆σ2p
− SPRp∆Rp
)
exp
[
1
2 z
2(σ2p)
P
] > 0
Ψ
F ≡ (2+ ρ)
(
1+ ν− SPσ2p∆σ2p − S
P
Rp
∆Rp
)
> 0
Ω ≡ 1+
γP − γF
νSF(1− z) + SP
{
SPσ2p
(2γPσ2k−b + 2σk−b,b)
−SPRp(1− γ
P)E(1+ Rb)(1− z)σ
2
k−b + S
P
Rp
[E(Rk)− E(Rb)]
}
≈ 1
ΩBP ≡
γP
νSF(1− z) + SP
{
SPRp(1− γ
P)E(1+ Rb)(1− z)σ
2
k−b − S
P
Rp [E(Rk)− E(Rb)]
−SPσ2p (2γ
Pσ2k−b + 2σk−b,b)
}
≈ 0
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Simulations show that the last two (negative) terms in the equation for ∆Rp are much
larger than the first term. For a large range of parameter values ∆Rp was always
smaller than −0.6. In the following I therefore assume that ∆Rp < 0. Moreover,
simulations show that the term between brackets in the expression for Ω, and thus
ΩBP as well, is fairly small. Therefore it holds that Ω is approximately equal to 1 and
ΩBP is close to 0.
Equations (71), (70) and (67) together give the system of equations in Section 3.
E Change capital-labour ratio at t = 1
The change in the capital-labour ratio at t = 1 is:
∂K1
∂ζ
= −
1
ΨP
∂TP0
∂ζ
−
1
1+ ν− SP
σ2p
∆σ2p
− SPRp∆Rp
∂BP1
∂ζ
Using equation (27) in the main text, we know that:
∂BP1
∂ζ
= −
∂TP0
∂ζ
So that we can write:
∂K1
∂ζ
=
1+ ρ
{1+ ρ + exp[ 12z
2(σ2P)
P]}(1 + ν− SP
σ2p
∆σ2p
− SPRp∆Rp)
∂TP0
∂ζ
As
∂TP0
∂ζ < 0 we know that
∂K1
∂ζ < 0. The intuition for this result is obvious. The young
generation at t = 0 receives a windfall gain as its PAYG tax is lowered, while their
future pension benefit does not change. Only part of this gain is saved, the other part
will be consumed. As the gain this generation receives equals the created debt, the
increase in savings at t = 0 is smaller than the created debt, so that public debt crowds
out part of the capital stock.
F Effects on utility
To analyse the utility effects, we first need to know what happens with consumption
in both periods of life. The change in consumption when young in country i, i = P, F,
is given by:
∂CY,it
∂ζ
=
∂Wt
∂ζ
−
∂Tit
∂ζ
−
∂TB,it
∂ζ
−
∂Sit
∂ζ
where ∂Tit/∂ζ = 0 for i = F. Country P lowers the PAYG tax T
P
t at t = 0 for one pe-
riod. This creates a windfall gain for the generation born at t = 0 and part of this gain
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will be saved and part will be consumed, i.e.,
∂CY,P0
∂ζ > 0. Consumption when young in
country F does not change at t = 0 as individuals in this country will only be affected
through the change in factor prices and the interest rate on government bonds. The
created public debt will crowd out part of the capital stock in the next period, which
lowers wages and affects consumption when young (and savings) negatively in both
countries. Consumption in the first period of life is further reduced by the rise in the
debt tax TB,it that results from the increase in the nominal interest rate on the debt and
for the PAYG country also because of the rise in public debt itself. So from period
t = 1 onwards
∂CY,it
∂ζ < 0.
The change in expected old-age consumption is:
∂EtC
O,i
t+1
∂ζ
= Si
∂EtR
i
p,t+1
∂ζ
+ E(1+ Rip)
∂Sit
∂ζ
The expected portfolio return will increase after a rise in government debt because
debt crowds out capital (ERk increases) and a higher debt level makes it more difficult
to finance the total amount of debt (higher ERb). The higher portfolio return has a
positive effect on old-age consumption. As explained above, savings in country P
will increase at t = 0 due to the windfall gain of the lower PAYG contributions. This
implies that the old-age consumption of the generation born at t = 0, i.e., CO,P1 will
unambiguously rise. From period t = 1 onwards, however, savings in both countries
fall as a result of the lower wages and the higher debt tax19, which affects old-age
consumption negatively. The negative effect of lower savings dampens the positive
effect of the higher portfolio return, but simulations show that for realistic parameter
values old-age consumption in both countries still increases compared to the initial
steady state.
The change in lifetime utility is equal to20:
∂EtU(C
Y,i
t ;C
O,i
t+1)
∂ζ
=
1
CY,i
∂CY,it
∂ζ
+
1
(1+ ρ)E(CO,i)
∂EtC
O,i
t+1
∂ζ
−
(1− z)2
2(1+ ρ)
∂(σ2pt)
i
∂ζ
(72)
where I used the assumption that CO,it+1 is a lognormally distributed variable so that
Et log(C
O,i
t+1) can be written as logEtC
O,i
t+1 −
1
2Vart logC
O,i
t+1, see equation (46). And for
country F it holds that z = 0. I will separately discuss the utility effects for the PAYG
country and the funded country.
19Savings in the PAYG country also react to changes in the expected portfolio return and the variance
on the portfolio, see equation (61). Both the rise in the portfolio return and the fall in the variance on
the portfolio (resulting from the fact that people switch from stocks to bonds) have a positive effect on
savings. So these indirect saving effects via EtR
P
p,t+1 and (σ
2
pt)
P reduce the negative saving effects of
lower wages and the higher debt tax to some extent.
20As before I do not show the indirect effect of changes in zt in the analytical expression, but this is
taken into account in the simulation graphs in the main text.
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PAYG country
The generation born at t = 0 has higher consumption levels in both periods of life and
will unambiguously experience positive utility effects. The next generations have
less consumption possibilities when young (due to the lower wage and the higher
debt tax) and the rise in old-age consumption will be less because savings fall over
time. In a dynamically efficient economy a fall in the capital-labour ratio implies
that the economy moves further away from the Golden Rule point where steady-
state lifetime utility is maximized. This implies that a lower capital-labour ratio has
negative utility effects in the long run. This negative Golden-Rule effect is reinforced
by the rise in the debt tax and an extra negative effect via the current account. The
PAYG country is a net borrower on the international capital market and will therefore
be adversely affected by the increase in the returns. The fall in the variance on the
portfolio, which results from the fact that people hold relatively more bonds in their
investment portfolio, dampens the negative utility effects to some extent.
The negative long-run utility effects of government debt for the PAYG country will
be smaller if it shares the capital market with a funded country. In that case part of the
public debt can be financed with savings of the funded country, which implies that
the crowding-out of the capital stock and the rise in the interest rate on debt will be
less. The PAYG country therefore experiences positive spillover effects from the fact
that it has an integrated capital market with the funded country.
Funded country
The fall in consumption when young affects lifetime utility negatively, while the in-
crease in consumption possibilities during old-age has positive utility effects. The
initial generations only experience the gains from a higher return on the portfolio;
they do not (fully) incur the losses that result from the lower wages. This means that
these initial generations experience positive spillovers from the rise in public debt in
the PAYG country. In the long run, however, it holds that the fall in the capital-labour
ratio has negative utility effects in a dynamically efficient economy as it moves away
from the Golden Rule point where total lifetime consumption is maximized. On the
other hand, the funded country is a net lender on the international capital market
and will therefore be affected positively by the rise in the portfolio return. If the
economy finds itself far enough from the Golden-Rule level of capital accumulation,
the negative Golden-Rule effect will dominate the positive current-account effect. In
Adema (2008b, Appendices 2.C.2 and 3.A.2) it is shown that this is the case for realistic
parameter values. Therefore, I conclude that lifetime utility decreases if the capital-
labour falls in a dynamically-efficient open economy, and the funded country will be
negatively affected in the long run by the rise in debt in the PAYG country. These
negative utility effects are reinforced by the fact that the debt tax in the funded coun-
try also rises as a result of the higher interest rate on government debt. The long-run
spillovers for the funded country are therefore negative.
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